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The incitement exception just celebrated its hundredth
birthday, or its fiftieth in its modern version.1 Forged amidst the
turmoil of political protest, the exception articulated inBrandenburg
v. Ohio, defines the circumstances in which protected abstract
advocacy of unlawful conduct crosses the constitutional line and
becomes unprotected “incitement” of it.2 Regulation of speech to
avoid the persuasive effect of itsmessage on listeners presumptively
violates the Constitution.3 The exception permits the government to
do so in circumstances where the speaker intends, by means of
speech that urges action, to persuade listeners to engage in unlawful
conduct, and the listeners’ move from receipt of the speech to action
† Justice Anthony M. Kennedy Endowed Professor of Law and Director,
Capital Center for Law & Policy, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
Thanks to Brooklyn Law School and the Brooklyn Law Review for hosting the
Symposium: Incitement At 100—And 50—And Today: Free Speech and Violence in the
Modern World. Thanks to Caroline Mala Corbin, David Han, Genevieve Lakier, and
Rodney Smolla for helpful comments on the presentation and on drafts. Thanks also to
Paul Howard for quick and useful research assistance, and to EmmaWoidtke for helpful
research and cite-checking assistance.
1 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (articulating the clear
and present danger test); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216–17 (1919);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (articulating the current
incitement exception).
2 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445, 449.
3 See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 481 (2014) (noting a law is not
content-neutral if it is “concerned with undesirable effects that arise from ‘the direct
impact of speech on its audience’ or ‘[l]isteners’ reactions to speech’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988))).
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is both likely and imminent.4 In this modern form, the Court has
never found speech to fit within the definition.5
The Court crafted the multiple elements of the
Brandenburg exception to rigorously protect advocacy of ideas in
the realm of public communication while preserving some scope
of authority of the government, acting in its sovereign capacity, to
fulfill its delegated function of ensuring public safety by means of
restricting speech that persuades listeners to commit specific
crimes.6 The narrow exception continues to do good work in the
context in which it was born, and has developed, where the
alleged calls to action occur within collective public speech
activities and the consequence of falling within the exception is
criminal punishment.7 Outside the realm of public
communication, and particularly where the heavy threat of
criminal punishment for speaking within the definition of the
exception does not exist, some form of “incitement lite,” with
elements adjusted to fit the different balance of government
authority and individual speech rights and impacts, may better
implement the spirit that animates and explains the exception.
Management by government agencies of private speech
on nonpublic forum property is one circumstance far outside the
realms of public communication and criminal punishment.8
Government entities operate nonpublic forums inside their
institutions in the course of fulfilling specific delegated
functions.9 Nonpublic forums include intra-agency mail
4 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (noting a state cannot “proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”); Bible Believers v.
Wayne County, 805 F.3d 228, 246 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“TheBrandenburg test precludes
speech from being sanctioned as incitement to riot unless (1) the speech explicitly or implicitly
encouraged the use of violence or lawless action, (2) the speaker intends that his speech will
result in the use of violence or lawless action, and (3) the imminent use of violence or lawless
action is the likely result of his speech.” (footnote omitted)).
5 Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 70 F. Supp. 3d 572, 581
(S.D.N.Y.) (“[T]he Supreme Court has rarely applied the Brandenburg incitement
standard, and never explicitly found speech to be on the proscribable side of the standard.”
(citing ERWINCHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONALLAW 1328 (4th ed. 2013))), vacated on other
grounds, 109 F. Supp. 3d 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
6 See infra notes 61–68 and accompanying text.
7 Rodney A. Smolla, Should the Brandenburg v. Ohio Incitement Test Apply
in Media Violence Tort Cases?, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 29 (2000).
8 Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018) (noting a
nonpublic forum is not a “space . . . for public communication” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250
(2015) (“We have previously used what we have called ‘forum analysis’ to evaluate
government restrictions on purely private speech that occurs on government property.”).
9 See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678
(1992) (stating a nonpublic forum exists when the role of the government, when it
regulates access to its property, is “as a proprietor, managing its internal operations,
rather than acting as [a] lawmaker with the power to regulate or license”).
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systems,10 chat rooms, and social media channels;11 the grounds
of military bases,12 and other government entities, such as a post
office13 or airports,14 which are not open to public speakers
generally; advertising platforms located inside transit vehicles
or facilities,15 or on websites that serve agency clients;16 and
bulletin boards, display cases, and literature distribution kiosks
aimed at employees or members of the public who form the
clientele for a government agency, such as library patrons.17
By contrast to the government when it manages property
dedicated to public communication among citizens, nonpublic
forum managers have substantial authority to distinguish among
types of outside speech they invite onto their properties to ensure
that the speech content is compatible with the properties and does
not provoke listener reactions that disrupt the operations of their
enterprises.18 They may restrict access so long as their judgments
are “reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”19 Speakers
engaging in nonpublic forum speech face much less severe impacts
than criminal punishment. These impacts range from requests
that they modify the form or content of their speech to exclusion
from the single speech channel. And, notably, exclusion of speakers
from nonpublic forums is limited to that speech channel alone and
all other channels of public communication remain open for the
speakers to spread their ideas and points of view.
The government’s institutional interest in restricting
both persuasive speech and the form of communication typical
of nonpublic forums also differs from those that explain the
Brandenburg exception elements. The persuasive speech that
nonpublic forum managers predict to be most threatening to
their abilities to fulfill their delegated functions is not speech
10 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
11 Electronic communication channels directed at an agency’s internal audience,
and which are not generally open to speakers from outside the agency, should be classified as
nonpublic forums like the physical school mail system in Perry. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
12 Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 830–31 (1976).
13 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990).
14 Lee, 505 U.S. at 681.
15 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 300–01, 304 (1974).
16 Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834, 844 (6th Cir. 2000).
17 Gay Guardian Newspaper v. Ohoopee Reg’l Library Sys., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1362,
1375, 1379 (S.D.Ga. 2002),aff’d, 90 F. App’x 386 (11thCir. 2003) (unpublished table decision).
18 Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018) (“[T]he government
has much more flexibility to craft rules limiting speech [on nonpublic forum property].”
(citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983))); Perry,
460 U.S. at 45 (“For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion [in a traditional public
forum,] it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”).
19 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
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that advocates unlawful conduct, but rather speech that severely
disrupts their operations by persuading their internal
audience—employees or the members of the public they are
charged with serving—to abandon the enterprise.20 And,
although some instances of private speech may specifically urge
that listeners engage in this type of highly disruptive conduct
and indeed the nonpublic forum’s operations are disturbed, the
private speech at issue rarely takes the form of face-to-face
communication, in which the timing of the speech and response
could possibly meet a strict definition of the Brandenburg
exception’s imminence requirement.21
Despite the very substantial differences in context,
doctrine drawn from the realm of public communication seems to
eliminate the ability of nonpublic forum managers to avoid
hosting this type of highly disruptive speech. On the one hand, an
unmodified application of the elements of the Brandenburg
exception does not permit institutional government entities to
exclude such speech as incitement. On the other hand, the
prohibition against viewpoint discrimination in nonpublic forum
management seems to make it impossible for these managers to
exclude speech, or even request the most minor modifications of
it, to avoid the result of the persuasive impact of its message
outside the boundaries of the incitement exception.22 This double
bind requires these government agencies to make a choice: open
their office mail systems, bulletin boards, websites, and internal
display and advertising spaces to private speech and accept the
damaging consequences or close these speech channels entirely.23
More and more government entities are opting for the latter
choice, thus restricting the free flow of information and ideas, and
raising the question of whether applying the Brandenburg
exception as the outer boundary of government authority to
20 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 804 (1985)
(accepting the President’s decision to exclude advocacy groups from participating in the
Combined Charitable Campaign as reasonable, based on evidence in the record that
including such groups caused employees to refuse to contribute).
21 Government entities may sometimes permit outside speakers to come onto
their property to address their internal audience, such as when the military invites
occasional outside speakers onto its base. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 830–31
(1976). More often, government entities permit outside speakers to be “present” on their
property by “virtual” means, such as distributing literature, see Perry, 460 U.S. at 46–
47, displaying advertisements, see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 300–
01, 304 (1974), or publishing content electronically. See Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of
Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834, 844 (6th Cir. 2000).
22 SeeMatal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (plurality opinion) (describing
the Court’s cases as defining the concept of viewpoint discrimination “in a broad sense”).
23 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)
(“Of course, the government ‘is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of
the facility.’” (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 46)).
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regulate persuasive speech best balances constitutional values on
nonpublic forum property.24
This piece proceeds in two parts. Part I sets out the
background of the incitement exception in the context of criminal
punishment. Its sections discuss the historical development of the
incitement exception, lines of cases outside the Brandenburg
paradigm, and recent applications. Part II explores the possibilities
for incitement lite adjustments to fit the nonpublic forum. The first
two sections explain the different balance of government authority
and speaker rights and impacts on nonpublic forum property and
describe a recent lower court’s rejection of a transit agency’s claim
that the Brandenburg exception allowed it to exclude an
advertisement as a means to show its poor fit in the nonpublic
forum context. Its third section suggests incitement lite
adjustments that better implement the spirit of the Brandenburg
exception in nonpublic forum management.
I. THE INCITEMENT EXCEPTION IN THE CONTEXT OF
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
A. Historical Development
The Court’s initial discussions about the existence and
scope of the current incitement exception also mark the origin of
its modern, highly speech-protective Free Speech Clause
jurisprudence.25 The concept of an incitement exception began
and evolved in response to government efforts to criminalize
speakers because the content of their public advocacy strongly
criticized that government’s structure or actions and so, the
government argued, risked persuading listeners to engage in
conduct that would undermine the state.26 In developing the
exception, the Court identified and articulated the enduring
principle that government censorship of ideas expressed by
individual citizens is a fundamental constitutional evil and
protection of the public expression of those ideas is a
fundamental purpose of the First Amendment’s free speech
guarantee.27 This principle underpins modern doctrine, whereby
24 See infra notes 182–185 and accompanying text.
25 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951) (“No important case
involving free speech was decided by this Court prior to Schenck v. United States . . . .”).
26 See, e.g., id. at 497 (World War I protest); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
655 (1925) (distributing a “Left Wing Manifesto”); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211,
213 (1919) (public speech praising Socialism).
27 See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
530, 538 (1980) (“To allow a government the choice of permissible subjects for public
debate would be to allow that government control over the search for political truth.”).
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“[c]ontent-based laws—those that target speech based on its
communicative content”—raise the presumption that the
government has engaged in unconstitutional censorship.28 To
overcome the presumption, a content-based speech restriction
must survive strict scrutiny review, meaning that the
government must prove that it “is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and . . . [is] narrowly drawn to achieve
[it].”29 As an alternative to strict scrutiny review, the
government may overcome the presumption of unconstitutional
action by demonstrating that the speech it seeks to suppress
falls within the precise definition of a category of speech
determined by the Court to be within the power of the
government to prohibit entirely.30 Incitement exists today within
free speech doctrine as one of these few per se exceptions.31
Evolution of the incitement exception began in the
context of anti-war protest. In Schenck v. United States, the
government charged and secured the conviction of two Socialist
party officials under the federal Espionage Act of 1917 for
conspiracy to cause insubordination in the Armed Forces and
obstruct the recruitment and enlistment of services.32 Their
crime was printing and distributing pamphlets to draft-age men
that argued that the war constituted involuntary servitude and
a “monstrous wrong against humanity in the interest of Wall
Street’s chosen few,” and urging them not to “submit to
intimidation” and to “[a]ssert [their] [r]ights,” most apparently
their right to petition for legislative change.33 Although the
Court unanimously upheld the conviction, Justice Holmes, in his
opinion, planted the seeds of the current incitement exception by
acknowledging that the Constitution limits the government’s
ability to punish speakers engaged in public advocacy on the
ground that their words may persuade listeners to engage in
harmful conduct to circumstances under which a “clear and
present danger” that such conduct will occur exists.34
28 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
29 Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) (citing
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
30 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010) (“[T]he First
Amendment has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited
areas . . . . These historic and traditional categories long familiar to the bar—including
obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct—are
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.” (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted)).
31 Id.
32 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48–49 (1919).
33 Id. at 51.
34 Id. at 52.
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The Court experimented with the incitement exception
over the next number of decades. Its modern, narrow scope is
most traceable to the opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis,
dissenting from and concurring with the Court’s decisions. In
these opinions, they articulated principles that explain the
narrow scope of the incitement exception and underpin the
entire free speech jurisprudence. Their discussions include the
purposes of free speech—to preserve a marketplace of ideas,35
facilitate representative democracy,36 and promote individual
self-development.37 They set root the understanding that for
these purposes to be fulfilled, the Constitution must protect
expression of even highly dangerous ideas,38 and the doctrinal
response that, almost always, the government must resort to the
remedy of “more speech” rather than repression to avoid harmful
listener responses to free expression.39
The exception evolved in response to speech that was
critical of other war efforts, capitalism, and the United States
system of government, as well as speech that advocated overthrow
of the government.40 In its brief per curiam decision in
Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court consolidated its doctrine and
articulated the definition of the incitement exception that remains
35 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market . . . .”).
36 SeeWhitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“Those who won our independence believed . . . . that fear breeds repression; that
repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies
in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that
the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.”), overruled in part by Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Every idea is an incitement. . . . Eloquence may set fire to
reason. . . . If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined
to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is
that they should be given their chance and have their way.”).
37 C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 254
(2011) (free speech facilitates “a person’s authority (or right) tomake decisions about herself”).
38 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (noting the government may
not ban speech that even “a vast majority of its citizens believes to be false and fraught
with evil consequence” (quoting Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring))).
39 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (arguing that “more
speech” is a remedy which should only be stifled in instances of emergency).
40 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516–17 (1951) (communist party
literature); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 245 (1937) (communist party literature);
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 360, 363 (communist labor party convention); Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 655
(distributing a “Left Wing Manifesto”); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 617–18 (Russian citizens
printing and distributing leaflets and circulars to encourage resistance to the United
States’ involvement in war); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212–13 (1919) (public
speech praising Socialism); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 205–07 (1919)
(criticizing the United States’ involvement in World War I); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 48–49 (1919) (World War I protest).
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the law today.41 At issue was the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan
leader under an Ohio anti-syndicalism statute substantially
similar to a California version, which the Court held to be
consistent with the free speech guarantee forty years earlier.42 The
Ohio statute made it a crime to “advocat[e] . . . the duty, necessity,
or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of
terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
reform” or to “voluntarily assembl[e] with any society, group, or
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of
criminal syndicalism.”43 Clarence Brandenburg was convicted
under the statute for speaking at a twelve-person Klan gathering
in rural Ohio. Participants wore hoods, some carried weapons, and
a news reporter’s film of the gathering was broadcast on local and
national television.44His speech contained derogatory references to
black and Jewish people, complained about the federal
government’s treatment of Caucasians, and stated that if such
treatment continued it was “possible that there might have to be
some revengeance [sic] taken.”45
Without reviewing the application of the statute to the
speech at issue, the Court overruled its prior decision and held
the statute on its face to be invalid. The Court noted it had
previously upheld the California statute “on the ground that,
without more, ‘advocating’ violent means to effect political and
economic change involves such danger to the security of the State
that the State may outlaw it” but that the conclusion that the
Constitution permits the government this broad a scope of
authority had been “thoroughly discredited by later decisions.”46
Those decisions, it explained, established a core constitutional
distinction between “the mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral
propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and
violence” and more concrete speech “preparing a group for violent
action and steeling it to such action.”47 The “principle” it drew
from those decisions was that the government may only “forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation” in
circumstances “where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.”48 Because the Ohio statute, by its terms,
41 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
42 See id. at 444–45; Whitney, 274 U.S. at 371.
43 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444–45 (quoting OHIOREV. CODEANN. § 2923.13).
44 Id. at 445–46.
45 Id. at 446.
46 Id. at 447.
47 Id. at 447–48 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961)).
48 Id. at 447.
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criminalized “mere advocacy,” it, like many similar statutes
across the nation, could not constitutionally be the ground for
convicting Clarence Brandenburg or any other speaker.49
The Court has considered application of the Brandenburg
incitement exception in a range of other circumstances in which it
could appear that the speaker engaged in “advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation,”50 but has never found the definition to be
met.51 In fact, the meaning of the multiple elements of the
incitement exception remains unclear.52 “[D]irected to inciting or
producing” means that the speaker must intend that the listener’s
reaction to the communication move beyond mere opinion change
to action.53 The Court has not explained the constitutional
grounding for the intent requirement.54 It appears to stem, at least
in part, from concerns about the level of culpability that should be
present for a speaker to qualify for criminal punishment.55 Free
speech concerns about the chilling effect on potential speakers who
fear criminal punishment for unintentional speech likely explain
the intent requirement as well.56
The occurrence of violent or unlawful conduct must be both
likely and imminent. Together, these requirements are supposed
to identify the circumstances in which the government’s need to
suppress speech to protect from harm outweighs the value of the
speech.57 The likelihood requirement obviously sets some sort of
49 Id. at 449.
50 Id. at 447.
51 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (flag burning); NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (civil rights boycott); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 701–02 (1977) (contraceptive advertisements);
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 106–09 (1973) (per curiam) (VietnamWar protest); Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971) (anti-draft message on the back of a jacket).
52 Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 70 F. Supp. 3d 572,
581 (S.D.N.Y.) (noting that “[t]he Court’s subsequent substantive discussions of
Brandenburg reveal no precise contours of the standard”), vacated on other grounds, 109
F. Supp. 3d 626, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
53 Hess, 414 U.S. at 108–09 (finding the speech at issue not to meet the
Brandenburg exception requirements because “there was no evidence or rational
inference from the import of the language, that his words were intended to produce, and
likely to produce, imminent disorder”); see Nwanguma v. Trump, 903 F.3d 604, 609 (6th
Cir. 2018) (noting an element of the Brandenburg test is that “the speaker intends that
his speech will result in the use of violence or lawless action”).
54 Larry Alexander, Reddish on Free Speech, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 593, 596
(2013) (Brandenburg’s intent requirement “serves no obvious free speech value”).
55 See Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54WM. &MARY
L. REV. 1633, 1648 n.72 (2013) (noting, with respect to the origin of the intent
requirement, that cases prior to Brandenburg “likened incitement to criminal attempt”).
56 See id. at 1684–85, 1685 n.229 (citing commenters and noting that “the
chilling effect is the only possible legitimate justification for speaker’s intent
requirements” but demonstrating that “empirical difficulties” make it impossible to
support the theory with respect to a particular legal rule).
57 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (combining the elements of likelihood and imminence to observe, with respect
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probability threshold, butwhat that level is andwhat conductmust
be probable is unclear.58 The requirement that the move from
speech to conduct also be imminent requires some level of
immediacy. It certainly stems from a strong preference for
discussion and deliberation, rather than suppression, as the
antidote to speech that may spur dangerous conduct.59 According
to strict interpretations of the requirement, the listener’s response
must be almost instantaneous.60
The Court’s few in-depth applications of the Brandenburg
incitement exception provide some guidance as to the meaning of
its elements. In Hess v. Indiana, the Court reversed the Indiana
Supreme Court’s holding that words uttered by a participant in
an anti-war protest met the incitement standard.61 In response to
law enforcement orders to clear the street, Gregory Hess along
with the 100–150 other protesters obeyed but Hess responded,
“We’ll take the [f-ing] street later [or again].”62 According to the
Court, the words “at worst, . . . amounted to nothing more than
advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time” and so
failed to meet the requirements that they be “intended to produce,
and likely to produce, imminent disorder.”63
to the speech the government sought to criminalize in the case, that “nobody can suppose
that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more,
would present any immediate danger that its opinions would hinder the success of the
government arms or have any appreciable tendency to do so”); Smolla, supra note 7, at
29 (“The immediacy requirement plays a vital role in the context of public
demonstrations and protest, in which there is grave concern that police may engage in
censorship of ideas in situations in which there may certainly be some risk of violence at
some indefinite future time, but there is no immediate physical emergency.”).
58 At one point, the Court weighed the level of probability against the severity
of the harm. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509–10 (1951). But the firm
likelihood requirement seems to require that the probability of conduct occurring must
exceed fifty percent. The number or percentage of listeners that must be likely to react
by means of conduct is also uncertain.
59 See, e.g., Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630–31 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Only the
emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels
to time warrants [suppressing speech].”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and
present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall
before there is opportunity for full discussion.”), overruled in part by Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam).
60 Some commentators insist that the move from speech to conduct must be
impulsive, rather than rational. See, e.g., S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Recalibrating the Cost of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg,
41 WM. &MARY L. REV. 1159, 1169 (2000) (noting Brandenburg’s imminence requirement
“demands that the speech cause an individual to act without rational thought”); David A.
Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 339
(1991) (arguing Brandenburg’s imminence element requires that the speech “brings about
the violation [of law] by bypassing the rational processes of deliberation”).
61 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 106–09 (1973) (per curiam).
62 Id. at 106–07.
63 Id. at 108–09.
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InNAACP v. ClaiborneHardware Co., the Court invalidated
an award of damages against black participants in a seven year
boycott of white-owned businesses.64 Its incitement discussion
focused on speeches given by Charles Evers, one of the leaders of the
boycott, in which he used “strong language” to urge listeners in the
crowd to complywith the boycott.65One speech included a statement
that “boycott violators would be ‘disciplined’ by their own people”
and another threatened, “If we catch any of you going in any of them
racist stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck.”66 Nevertheless, in
the Court’s evaluation, the “emotionally charged rhetoric . . . did not
transcend the bounds of protected speech set forth in
Brandenburg.”67 The Court continued to opine that “[s]trong and
effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely channeled in
purely dulcet phrases” and “[a]n advocate must be free to stimulate
his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals.”68 The Court
further stated that “[w]hen such appeals do not incite lawless action,
they must be regarded as protected speech.”69
B. Lines of Cases Outside the Brandenburg Paradigm
Several other lines of cases qualify the constitutional
standard used to gauge the government’s authority to punish
harm-causing speech under the Brandenburg incitement
exception. These three lines of cases address hostile audience
reaction, intentional efforts to persuade someone to commit
crimes, and true threats.
The first line of cases precludes the government from
suppressing speech to protect listeners from “offense,” or from
enforcing a “heckler’s veto” to avoid violence or other harmful
conduct by listeners hostile to the message.70 Extreme offensive
64 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915–20 (1982) (damages
awarded for the tort of malicious interference with business relations).
65 Id. at 928.
66 Id. at 902.
67 Id. at 928.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 SeeMatal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (plurality opinion) (“[P]ublic
expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves
offensive to some of their hearers.” (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592
(1969))); see also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011) (speech can “inflict great
pain” but the speaker cannot be punished for this); Forsyth County v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992) (“Speech cannot be financially burdened, any
more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob.”);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”); HARRY
KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140 (1965) (“If the police can
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and hurtful hate speech is constitutionally protected when uttered
in the public sphere.71 Government actions to suppress speech that
demeans on the basis of race, religion, sex, or other group traits
unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.72 The
pre-Brandenburg case, Feiner v. New York, stands as the possible
example of the Court interpreting the Constitution to allow
punishment of a speaker because of the predicted reactions of
hostile listeners.73 But the facts of the case make this reading one
of several possibilities and in later cases, “the Supreme Court
appears to have eviscerated Feiner of whatever authority it had.”74
More recent cases limit the government’s ability to rely on the
incitement exception as the ground for imposing criminal
punishment for instances of public advocacy to those where the
conduct it seeks to avoid occurs because listenersmay be persuaded
by the speaker’s message rather than react with hostility to it.75
Another line of cases makes clear that the Brandenburg
incitement exception does not establish the limit to the
government’s authority to suppress speech integral to criminal
conduct.76 Definitions of crimes such as aiding and abetting,77
silence the speaker, the law in effect acknowledges a veto power in hecklers who can, by
being hostile enough, get the law to silence any speaker of whom they do not approve.”).
71 See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1764–65 (“Speech that demeans on the basis of race,
ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the
proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express
‘the thought that we hate.’” (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655
(1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
72 See id. at 1764.
73 See Feiner v. New York. 340 U.S. 315, 319–21 (1951).
74 Bible Believers v. Wayne County, 805 F.3d 228, 245 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc)
(“Supreme Court precedent illustrates that the speaker’s advocacy in Feiner itself could
no longer be sanctioned as incitement.”); see Frederick Schauer, The Hostile Audience
Revisited, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. AT COLUM. U. (Nov. 2, 2017), https://knight
columbia.org/content/hostile-audience-revisited [https://perma.cc/C2V2-F6MG] (asking
“[w]as Feiner charged with provoking a hostile audience or with inciting a sympathetic
one?” and reviewing the cases and concluding that one thing that is “settled” or probably
settled when an audience threatens violence in hostile reaction to a speaker is that “the
state may not prosecute on grounds of incitement the speakers whose speech has
prompted the reactions”).
75 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (defining fighting words as a
“direct personal insult”); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (words
must “inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”); Bible Believers,
805 F.3d at 246 (reviewing Supreme Court cases and concluding “[t]he hostile reaction
of a crowd does not transform protected speech into incitement”; and explaining that the
hostile reaction of an individual to speech delivered one-on-one may justify criminal
punishment under the “fighting words” exception).
76 See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498, 504 (1949)
(holding injunction against labor picketing did not violate free speech guarantee because
the message on the signs and the activity of picketing were part of “a single and integrated
course of [illegal] conduct”).
77 CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (criminalizing a person who has “advised and
encouraged its commission”).
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solicitation,78 and obstruction of justice79 criminalize intentionally
persuading another to commit a crime. In United States v.
Williams, the Court rejected the lower court’s application of the
incitement exception to limit the federal government’s authority to
criminalize speech soliciting the transfer of child pornography.80 It
distinguished “proposal[s] to engage in illegal activity,” which it
held to be “categorically excluded from the First Amendment,” from
“the abstract advocacy of illegality” protected by the Brandenburg
incitement definition.81 The Court specifically rejected the lower
court’s interpretation of the incitement exception as protecting
noncommercial “promotion” of child pornography, distinguishing
the statute’s focus on speech aimed at inducing entry into a
particular illegal transaction from “abstract advocacy, such as the
statement ‘I believe that child pornography should be legal’ or even
‘I encourage you to obtain child pornography.’”82 Although the
precise line between protected advocacy of unlawful action and
unprotected persuasion to commit a crime blurs at the
intersection,83 the Court’s firm placement of the common law
crimes of complicity and encouragement outside First Amendment
protection confirms that the constitutional protection for
persuasive speech varies according to the balance of speaker rights
and government authority in the circumstances of delivery and
that even when the speaker faces criminal punishment, words of
persuasion alone may form the basis for liability.
In a third line of cases, lower courts have held that the
incitement exception does not mark the limit of government
authority to criminalize persuasive speech uttered in the public
realm when the speech falls within the definition of a “true
threat,” another categorical exception.84 The same speech may
persuade some listeners to engage in harmful conduct, and other
listeners that the harmful conduct will befall them.85 The Ninth
78 18 U.S.C.§ 373(a) (criminalizing a person who intentionally “solicits,
commands, induces, or otherwise endeavors to persuade [an] other person to engage in
[a crime of violence]”).
79 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (criminalizing a person who knowingly “corruptly
persuades another person [to engage in acts that obstruct justice]).
80 United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 289, 298–99 (2008) (rejecting an
overbreadth challenge to statutory language that criminalizes a person who knowingly
“advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits” child pornography).
81 Id. at 298–99.
82 Id. at 299–300.
83 SeeUnited States v. Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461, 485 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding
statute that allows conviction for encouraging or persuading violation of immigration laws to
be overbroad on its face), cert. granted, No. 19-67, 2019 WL 4889927 (Oct. 4, 2019).
84 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (citing Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam)).
85 Id. at 360 (“[A] prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s] individuals from the
fear of violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders,’ in addition to protecting
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Circuit’s en banc decision upholding a civil damages award and
an injunction against the “Nuremberg Files” website provides an
early example of such speech.86 The American Coalition of Life
Activists (ACLA) maintained an anti-abortion website on which
it published “WANTED” posters of physicians who performed
abortions along with identifying information.87 As physicians
identified by the posters were murdered, their names were
struck through on the website.88 The content and the
circumstances of ACLA’s expression did not seem to satisfy the
incitement exclusion’s requirement that there be a sufficiently
tight link between intentional persuasion and sympathetic
listener action.89 Viewed from the perspective of different
listeners, however, the court held the persuasive content of the
speech to link sufficiently tightly to the different harm
addressed by the true threat exception, which the Court has held
that the government may suppress speech to prevent.90 Other
courts have reached similar conclusions.91 The precise means by
which to distinguish circumstances in which speech should be
analyzed as presenting true threats as well as, or as opposed to,
incitement remains subject to dispute, and the Court has not
weighed in. These cases remain significant to the scope of the
government’s discretion to suppress persuasive speech; however,
because they illustrate that perceptions of different listeners to
a single communication may differ, those different perceptions
may result in harms outside the incitement exception that the
government may also restrict speech to prevent.
people ‘from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.’” (second alteration
in original) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992))).
86 See Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002). The court remanded for consideration of
whether the punitive damages awarded comported with due process. Id.
87 Id. at 1062.
88 Id. at 1065.
89 Id. at 1072 (“If ACLA had merely endorsed or encouraged the violent actions
of others, its speech would be protected. However, while advocating violence is protected,
threatening a person with violence is not.”).
90 Id. at 1077 (defining a true threat as “a statement which, in the entire context
and under all the circumstances, a reasonable person would foresee would be interpreted
by those to whom the statement is communicated as a serious expression of intent to inflict
bodily harm upon that person”). The Ninth Circuit later adjusted its definition of true
threat. See United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1116–18 (9th Cir. 2011).
91 See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 432–34 (2d Cir. 2013); see also
Marc Rohr, “Threatening” Speech: The Thin Line Between Implicit Threats, Solicitation, and
Advocacy of Crime, 13 RUTGERS J.L.&PUB. POL’Y 150, 155–67 (2015) (discussing cases).
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C. Recent Applications
Two recent decisions from the Sixth Circuit illustrate the
modern context and scope of the incitement exception. The first
case, Bible Believers v. Wayne County, arose from the effective
removal of members of an evangelical Christian group from the
2012 Arab International Festival in Dearborn, Michigan.92
Members of the group entered the grounds of the festival, which
was open to the public, displaying banners, signs, and T-shirts with
Christian conversion and anti-Muslim messages.93 One member
“carried a severed pig’s head on a spike,” to “ke[ep] [the Muslims]
at bay.”94 Although the activities of the Bible Believers group
remained non-violent, a separate group of teenagers gathered
around the group, jeered, shouted profanities, and threw bottles,
eggs, and, at one point, milk crates, injuring at least one of the
Bible Believers protesters. Although the group leader requested
protection, the police refused, and instead asked them to leave,
threatening arrest if they did not.95 Members of the group brought
a federal civil rights action against the police.96 The Sixth Circuit
held that police officers’ removal of the protesters without first
making “bona fide efforts to protect the speaker from the crowd’s
hostility by other, less restrictive means,” resulted in a “heckler’s
veto” that violated the members’ free speech rights.97
Before reaching this conclusion, the court addressed the
applicability of the incitement exception to justify the police
action of restricting the members’ right to speak. The court
restated the Brandenburg test to require that “(1) the
[restricted] speech explicitly or implicitly encouraged the use of
violence or lawless action, (2) the speaker intends that his
speech will result in the use of violence or lawless action, and (3)
the imminent use of violence or lawless action is the likely result
of his speech.” It found the first two elements to be missing
“simply because [the Bible Believers] did not utter a single word
that can be perceived as encouraging violence or lawlessness”
92 Bible Believers v. Wayne County, 805 F.3d 228, 238–41 (6th Cir. 2015) (en
banc). Police officers threatened members of the group with a disorderly conduct citation
if they did not leave, then followed their van, stopped it, and cited them for removing a
license plate. Id. at 240-41
93 Id. at 238. Slogans included, “Islam Is A Religion of Blood and Murder” and
“Jesus Is the Way, the Truth and the Life. All Others Are Thieves and Robbers.” Id.
94 Id. (alterations in original). The group leader explained that “unfortunately,
they are kind of petrified of that animal.” Id.
95 Id. at 239–41.
96 Id. at 233.
97 Id. at 252, 255 (“Simply stated, the First Amendment does not permit a
heckler’s veto.”). The court also held that the removal violated the members’ rights to
free exercise of religion and equal protection. Id. at 255–57.
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and “there is absolutely no indication of the Bible Believers’
subjective intent to spur their audience to violence.”98 As to the
third element, even though unlawful violent action in fact
occurred, the court concluded bluntly, “[t]he hostile reaction of a
crowd does not transform protected speech into incitement.”99
The events addressed by the Sixth Circuit in Nwanguma
v. Trump occurred at a presidential campaign rally at the
Kentucky International Convention Center in Louisville.100 In
response to peaceful protest activities which occurred during his
speech, candidate Donald Trump five times interjected “get ‘em
out of here” followed at least once by the caveat, “Don’t hurt
‘em.”101 Listeners responded by “assault[ing], push[ing] and
shov[ing]” the protesters and punching one of them in the
stomach.102 The protesters filed suit against Trump, his campaign,
and the supporters who engaged in the acts of violence, alleging,
among other things, Trump’s words and conductmet the state law
definition of incitement to riot.103
The court held that Trump’s words failed to meet the
statutory definition but nevertheless continued to evaluate
whether the Constitution protects his speech because themessages
fall outside the Brandenburg definition of incitement.104 The court
applied the Bible Believers court’s summary of the Brandenburg
requirements finding, as to the first element, that “not a single
word [in Trump’s speech] encouraged violence or lawlessness,
explicitly or implicitly.”105 The court acknowledged that “[i]n the
ears of some supporters, Trump’s words [‘get ‘em out of here’] may
have had a tendency to elicit a physical response, in the event a
disruptive protester refused to leave,” but concluded that because
the words “did not specifically advocate for listeners to take
98 Id. at 246 (footnote omitted).
99 Id.
100 Nwanguma v. Trump, 903 F.3d 604, 606–07 (6th Cir. 2018).
101 Id. at 608.
102 Id. at 606–07.
103 Id. at 607. Plaintiffs filed their complaint in state court. The Trump
defendants removed it to federal court. The district court dismissed all claims against
the Trump defendants except incitement to riot. Id. at 607. Incitement to riot, KY. REV.
STAT. § 525.040, is actionable in damages under KY. REV. STAT. § 446.070. Incitement to
riot occurs when a person “incites or urges five (5) or more persons to create or engage
in a riot.” KY. REV. STAT. § 525.040(1). A “[r]iot” is “a public disturbance involving an
assemblage of five (5) or more persons which by tumultuous and violent conduct creates
grave danger of damage or injury to property or persons.” KY. REV. STAT. § 525.010(5).
104 Nwanguma, 903 F.3d at 609 (“The notion that Trump’s direction to remove
a handful of disruptive protesters from among hundreds or thousands in attendance
could be deemed to implicitly incite a riot is simply not plausible—especially where any
implication of incitement to riotous violence is explicitly negated by the accompanying
words, ‘don’t hurt ‘em.’”).
105 Id. at 610.
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unlawful action,” they fell outside the Brandenburg definition.106
Additionally, the admonition, “don’t hurt ‘em[,] . . . undercut[] the
alleged violence-inciting sense of [the] words.”107
The Sixth Circuit chastised the district court for relying on
the second and third elements to attribute a message of
encouragement of violence to the words. The court read Supreme
Court doctrine to teach that the three elements of incitement must
be met independently, meaning that “the speaker’s intent to
encourage violence (second factor) and the tendency of his
statement to result in violence (third factor) are not enough to
forfeit First Amendment protection unless the words used
specifically advocate[] the use of violence, whether explicitly or
implicitly (first factor).”108 So, the fact that some Trump supporters
reacted to his words with violence was not dispositive as to the
meaning of the words.109 Emphasizing that the “actual words used
by the speaker” must be the focus of the incitement inquiry, the
court rejected the protesters’ claim that those words advocated,
either explicitly or implicitly, the acts of violence perpetrated
against them by Trump’s listeners.110
These modern cases demonstrate the very small slice of
space the Brandenburg incitement exception currently occupies
in free speech doctrine. The circumstances of both cases mirror
those in which the concept of incitement as a mode of unprotected
speech developed—words uttered as part of the broader advocacy
of opinions and ideas about public issues, directed toward
listeners in their status as citizens, in which criminal punishment
is the consequence of speaking within the exception. Both cases
involve in-person, ongoing communication between speakers and
a crowd of listeners, in which members of the crowd threatened
immediate violent action. The contemporaneous crowd-control
context is the only one in the last number of decades in which the
Court has seriously considered application of the Brandenburg
exception and, if its elements are read strictly, the only one in
which it could be found to apply.
106 Id. at 610, 612.
107 Id. at 612.
108 Id. at 611 (interpreting the Court’s statements in Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S.
105 (1973) (per curiam)).
109 Id. at 613 (“[T]he subjective reaction of any particular listener cannot dictate
whether the speaker’s words enjoy constitutional protection.”).
110 Id.
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II. THE INCITEMENT EXCEPTIONOUTSIDE THE THREAT OF
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT: THENONPUBLIC FORUM
A. Government Authority to Manage Speech to Avoid
Disruption on Nonpublic Forum Property
The Brandenburg incitement exception developed to
implement the balance of government authority and individual
speech rights in places where speakers and listeners engage in
highly protected “public communication.”111 Public communication
occurs when speakers communicate with listeners in their
capacities as citizens, pursuing their own individual purposes by
means of receiving information and ideas, and participating in
discussion and debate.112 When public communication occurs on
certain types of government property, which the Court has
designated as traditional public forums, it receives the same level
of heightened constitutional protection as when it flows through
private speech channels.113
Streets, parks, and sidewalks are paradigmatic traditional
public forum properties, which are defined and limited by a
history of being dedicated, at least in part, to public speech.114 The
government manages traditional public forum property in its
sovereign capacity. When it does so, it must “accommodate
private speakers” and treat them equally regardless of its intent
to do so, and despite its obligation to manage competing non-
speech uses of the property.115 The strict scrutiny review of limits
on the free speech of private speakers guarantees both equal
access and treatment with respect to the content and the
viewpoints expressed in their speech.116 The consequence of these
guarantees is that the public must absorb the cost of protecting
the right of all speakers and listeners to engage in communication
of all types of information and ideas, however unwanted the
111 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)
(distinguishing traditional public forum property from nonpublic forum property on the
ground that the former is “a forum for public communication” and the latter is not).
112 See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and
Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1715 (1987) (distinguishing traditional
public forum property and nonpublic forum property according to the role of the government).
113 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)
(“Because a principal purpose of traditional public fora is the free exchange of ideas,
speakers can be excluded from a public forum only when the exclusion is necessary to serve
a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.”).
114 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015)
(“TheCourthas rejected the view that traditional public forumstatus extends beyond its historic
confines.” (quoting Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998))).
115 Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677–78.
116 Id. at 677 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 802 (1985)).
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speech may be to the government or to the majority of other
citizens who frequent the property.117
The balance of government authority and individual speech
rights differs substantially on nonpublic forum property.118 The
government as an institutional entity with a delegated
responsibility to fulfill a discrete public mission other than hosting
public speech creates and administers a nonpublic forum when it
chooses to invite some group of private speakers onto its
property.119 In most instances, the property or program is a true
“forum” in the sense that the government manager runs a channel
of communication on its property or through its program,120 and the
speech that flows through it is nonpublic in the sense that it is
broadcast solely within the institution or enterprise that hosts the
117 Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–37 (1992)
(government may not charge speakers a fee measured by the cost of protecting them from
a hostile audience); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1975) (“[T]he
burden normally falls upon the viewer to ‘avoid further bombardment of [his]
sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes.’” (second and third alterations in original)
(quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971))).
118 SeeWalker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250
(2015) (“We have previously used what we have called ‘forum analysis’ to evaluate
government restrictions on purely private speech that occurs on government property.”);
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983) (labelling and
describing types of forums). Although the Court’s terminology has not been consistent, its
most recent iteration uses the label of nonpublic forum to describe government property or
programs that differ from traditional public forums and created, or designated, public
forums in that they are not “space[s] . . . for public communication.” Minn. Voters All. v.
Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018) (“Generally speaking, our cases recognize three types
of government-controlled spaces: traditional public forums, designated public forums, and
nonpublic forums.”); see Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. King County, 136 S. Ct. 1022, 1022
(2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[A] limited public forum [is]
[ ] also called a nonpublic forum[ ] . . . .”);Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250–51 (traditional public
forum, designated public forum, limited public forum, nonpublic forum); Christian Legal
Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679
n.11 (2010) (traditional public forum, designated public forum, limited public forum);
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (traditional public forum, designated public forum, nonpublic
forum); Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46 (listing the traditional public forum, the designated or
limited public forum, and the nonpublic forum); see alsoNAACP v. City of Philadelphia, 39
F. Supp. 3d 611, 618 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“[I]t is unclear what categories of fora even exist.”).
119 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2251 (stating a nonpublic forum exists when the
government invites private speakers onto its property in its role “as a proprietor,
managing its internal operations.”).
120 See Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. 661, 681–82 (students were audience for
student group communications); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 830–31 (1995) (students were audience for student publications); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 675–76 (1992) (private entities permitted access to
airport terminals to engage in some forms of speech); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720,
723 (1990) (private entities permitted access to sidewalk leading to entry to post office);
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803 (discussing how to classify “instrumentalit[ies] used for
communication” and participation in federal government’s Combined Charitable Campaign
made available to defined class of private charities);Perry, 460U.S. at 47 (schoolmail facilities
made available to some outside groups); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 830–31 (1976) (some
outside speakers permitted access to a military base); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298, 300–01 (1974) (private entities participate in public transit advertising program).
But see Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1886 (polling place is a nonpublic forum).
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speech, rather to the public generally.121 Nonpublic forums
evaluated by the Court include military authorities managing
outside speakers present on base,122 a school board operating an
internal mail system,123 a U.S. post office branch managing private
speech activities on the sidewalk entry to its building,124 and an
airport managing speakers who want to communicate with
travelers inside the terminals.125
Because hosting public communication is not a primary
responsibility of nonpublic forum managers, the scope of their
authority to restrict speech is greater than the authority of the
government-as-sovereign when it manages access to traditional
public forum property.126 By contrast to traditional public forum
property, private speakers have no constitutional right of access
to nonpublic forum property.127 When nonpublic forum managers
choose to grant access to private speakers, they may limit access
according to speaker identity and the content of the speech,
grounds which are forbidden to traditional public forum
managers. Specifically, the government manager may define the
boundaries of the speech invited into the enterprise to avoid
listener reactions to the content of the speech that may disrupt
the nonspeech operations of the enterprise.128 So, a school system
may exclude a rival union’s communications from its internal
mail system to avoid transforming the schools into “battlefield[s]
for inter-union squabbles” and disrupting “labor peace,”129 the
federal government may exclude advocacy nonprofits from
participating in its annual charitable campaign because their
advocacy for certain causes might cause employees not to
121 Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 681–82 (students were audience for student
group communications); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830–31 (students were audience for
student publications); Lee, 505 U.S. at 675–76 (airplane passengers were audience for
speech activities inside terminals); Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 723 (post office patrons were
audience for solicitors on sidewalk leading to entry); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803 (employers
were audience for the charitable campaign); Perry, 460 U.S. at 47 (mail system “facilitate[s]
internal communication of school-related matters to the teachers”);Greer, 424 U.S. at 830–
31 (outside speakers addressed members of the military); Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302, 305–
07 (although location of all car cards was not clear, the plurality and concurring justice
addressed the forum assuming that the audience for the advertising were bus patrons).
122 Greer, 424 U.S. at 838.
123 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
124 Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730.
125 Lee, 505 U.S. at 680–81.
126 Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1885 (noting an institutional government
entity, managing access to a nonpublic forum, “has much more flexibility to craft rules
limiting speech” (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 46)).
127 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (school board may close internal mail system “to all but
official business if it chooses” (quoting lower court decision in Perry Local Educators’
Ass’n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1301 (7th Cir. 1981))).
128 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 49 (noting access distinctions may be for the purpose of
“limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the intended purpose of the property”).
129 Id. at 52 (quoting Haukedahl v. Sch. Dist. No. 108, 75-C-3641 (N.D. Ill. 1976)).
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donate,130 a transit system may exclude revenue-generating
political advertisements because of the possible adverse reactions
of customers to its “controversial” content,131 and a post office
branch or an airport may exclude solicitation activity from their
property because its effects on the flow of pedestrians “would
prove quite disruptive.”132 Like traditional public forum
managers, however, nonpublic forum managers may not
discriminate among private speakers according to the viewpoints
expressed in their speech.133
The impact on private speakers of nonpublic forum
regulation also differs substantially from the speaker impact of
traditional public forum regulation. The most severe impact of
nonpublic forum regulation is exclusion from the forum, as opposed
to criminal punishment and other sanctions that apply to regulation
of public communication. So, the risk that such speech regulation
would create a chilling effect that would deter potential speakers
seeking access to the forums should not exist.134 Nonpublic forum
management operates through a process of review and
permission,135which often includes the alternative of granting access
130 Cornelius v. NAACPLegal Def. &Educ. Fund, 473U.S. 788, 809 (1985) (noting
that “the President could reasonably conclude” that the public services performed by the
excluded advocacy organization were less “beneficial” than those of the organizations of the
type included in the charity campaign forum, or he could have excluded the group as means
of “avoiding the appearance of political favoritism” and “avoiding controversy that would
disrupt the workplace” and the fundraising campaign).
131 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality
opinion) (upholding “the managerial decision to limit car card space to innocuous and
less controversial commercial and service-oriented advertising”); id. at 306–07 (Douglas,
J., concurring) (relying on the captive audience theory).
132 Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 684–85 (1992);
see United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732–33 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(“[S]olicitation is inherently disruptive of the Postal Service’s business.”).
133 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v.
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010) (recognizing that nonpublic forum managers may
exercise their authority to define entry and exclude speech so long as they act reasonably
in light of the purpose of the forum and provide equal access to viewpoints within the
types of invited speech (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 829 (1995))).
134 See Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive
Approach to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 1032 (2012) (“[G]overnments
‘chill’ protected speech by restricting some other form of speech that, while unprotected,
is similar to the speech getting chilled.”).
135 See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239,
2251 (2015) (a practice of requiring permission signals that the program is not a public
forum); Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998) (“[T]he
government does not create a designated public forum when it does no more than reserve
eligibility for access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose members must
then, as individuals, ‘obtain permission,’ to use it.” (citation omitted)); Cornelius, 473 U.S.
at 804–05 (“The Government’s consistent policy has been to limit participation in the CFC
to ‘appropriate’ voluntary agencies and to require agencies seeking admission to obtain
permission from federal and local Campaign officials. Although the record does not show
how many organizations have been denied permission throughout the 24-year history of
the CFC, there is no evidence suggesting that the granting of the requisite permission is
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to the speech, with content modifications, as opposed to excluding
the speech from the forum entirely. This type ofmiddle ground is not
available in the regulation of public communication.136 And, even
when the speech is excluded entirely from a nonpublic forum, the
exception applies to that venue only, with all channels of public
communication still open and available to host the speech.
A final difference between nonpublic and traditional public
forum regulation is that a nonpublic forummanager may choose to
close its forum entirely to public speakers to avoid hosting speech
it predicts will be harmful. The Court has explicitly noted that its
deferential review of distinctions drawn by nonpublic forum
managers in granting access to private speakers fulfills free speech
values by “encourag[ing] the government to open its property to
some expressive activity in cases where, if faced with an all-or-
nothing choice, it might not open the property at all.”137
B. The Brandenburg Exception in the Nonpublic Forum
A recent attempt by the New York Metropolitan Transit
Authority (MTA) to exclude speech from its advertising program
illustrates the difficulties forummanagers face when they attempt
to frame their predictions that speech will provoke listeners to
engage in harmful conduct within the Brandenburg incitement
definition.138 MTA posts advertisements in and around its
merely ministerial. . . . Such selective access, unsupported by evidence of a purposeful
designation for public use, does not create a public forum.”); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983) (“Permission to use the system to
communicate with teachers must be secured from the individual building principal. There
is no court finding or evidence in the record which demonstrates that this permission has
been granted as a matter of course to all who seek to distribute material.”).
136 Content-based exclusions from a traditional public forummust survive strict
scrutiny. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
137 Forbes, 523 U.S. at 680.
138 See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 70 F. Supp. 3d 572,
574–75 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated on other grounds, 109 F. Supp. 3d 626, 627–28 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (dismissing access challenge after transit authority changed its policy to exclude
all public issue advertisements). Circuit courts differ on the proper classification of
transit advertising programs. See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. King County, 136 S.
Ct. 1022, 1024–025 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (pointing out
the split among the circuits and opining that the Court should grant certiorari to resolve
it). The original Southern District decision classified the MTA program as “a designated
public forum under binding Second Circuit precedent.” Am. Freedom Def. Initiative, 70
F. Supp. 3d at 580 (citing N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 130 (2d
Cir. 1998)). Although the standard of review of exceptions from designated public forums
differs from that which applies to nonpublic forums, the rule against viewpoint
discrimination, which is the basis for the difficulties forum managers face in framing
their exceptions, applies to each in the same way. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (“[W]hen
the Government has intentionally designated a place or means of communication as a
public forum, speakers cannot be excluded without a compelling governmental interest.
Access to a nonpublic forum, however, can be restricted as long as the restrictions are
‘reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials
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transportation facilities and vehicles for the purpose of raising
revenue to fund its operations.139 MTA attempted to rely on the
incitement exception as its ground for refusing to post an
advertisement on its buses.140 The advertisement, submitted by the
American Freedom Defense Initiative (AFDI), a pro-Israel
advocacy organization, “portrayed a menacing-looking man whose
head and face [were] mostly covered by a head scarf” with a quote
from “Hamas MTV”: “Killing Jews is Worship that draws us close
to Allah.”141 “Underneath the quote, the ad[vertisement] stated:
‘That’s His Jihad. What’s yours?’”142 The MTA claimed that the
advertisement would incite viewers to commit unlawful acts of
violence.143 A federal district court in the Southern District of New
York reviewed MTA’s claim.
Consistent with the definition of the exception, the court
sought “evidence or rational inference from the import of the
language” to show that the advertisement was “intended to
produce, and likely to produce, imminent lawless action.”144 The
transit authority acknowledged that the advertisement’s sponsors
did not subjectively intend to incite violence.145 It argued, however,
that the advertisement’s objective intent, interpreted through the
perspective of “a subset of Islamic extremists” was “an implicit
command to follow the Hamas quote and commit violent acts
oppose the speaker’s view.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at
46)). The format of the MTA advertising forum is typical of nonpublic forums and the
doctrinal barriers it faced are the same as a nonpublic forum manager would face.
Therefore, it illustrates the difficulties that nonpublic forummanagers would face if they
sought to exclude the same type of speech on the same basis.
139 Am. Freedom Def. Initiative, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 575.
140 Id. at 576.
141 Id. at 574. Both sides agreed to refer to the submission as the ‘“Killing Jews’
advertisement.” Id. at 575.
142 Id. at 574. “The bottom of the ad included a disclaimer that it was sponsored
by the plaintiff organization . . . and did not imply the [transit authority’s] endorsement
of the views expressed by the ad.” Id.
143 Id. at 577–78. The MTA amended their advertising standards and added
language that “precluded any advertisement that ‘contains material the display of which
the MTA reasonably foresees would imminently incite or provoke violence or other
immediate breach of the peace, and so harm, disrupt, or interfere with safe, efficient, and
orderly transit operations.’” Id. at 576. The transit authority also argued that the ad fell
into the fighting words exception. The court quickly rejected this claim. Id. at 580–81
(questioning whether fighting words, which must be “directed to the person of the hearer,”
could ever be communicated through advertising space and finding that even if they could,
the particular Hamas-TV quote “would [not] tend to incite an ‘immediate breach of the
peace’” (first quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971); and then quoting Provost
v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 160 (2d Cir. 2011))).
144 Id. at 581 (quoting Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (per curiam)).
145 Id. at 582, 582 n.7 (declining to decide whether the Brandenburg test
requires a subjective or objective intent because it found the lesser, objective intent
standard not to be met).
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against Jewish people.”146 The court rejected this interpretation as
“thoroughly unpersuasive.”147 Because the advertisement “clearly
attribute[d] the ‘killing Jews’ quote to HamasMTV and contain[ed]
a visible attribution of the ad to [its sponsor], and not to Hamas,”
the court found it did not advocate violence on its face.148 As to the
claim that the advertisement would incite a small subset to
violence, the court reasoned that “if that group is as violent and
radicalized as the [the transit authority] contend[s], presumably
they would not need a bus advertisement to remind them of
Hamas’s interpretation of the Quran.”149
The court also found that the transit authority had not
sufficiently demonstrated that violence was likely or imminent.
The transit authority could not produce any “evidence of any
violent responses to [the] same advertisement when it ran in
[other cities], or even to any similar ad in any city.”150 The court
rejected the transit authority’s attempt to distinguish the likely
reactions of New York viewers from those in other cities.151 The
transit authority, the court said, “underestimate[d] the tolerant
quality of New Yorkers and overestimate[d] the potential impact
of [the] fleeting advertisements.”152 The court also rejected the
transit agency’s claim that “a generalized, heightened ‘potential’
for violent acts due to the city in which [an] ad would be shown”
may qualify the speech as incitement.153 Rather, to exclude
speech as incitement, the government must show that the
message of the particular advertisement, in that context, meets
the elements of the category. The transit agency, the court
concluded, had “made no such showing.”154
Through this reasoning, the court rejected MTA’s bid to
exclude the speech as incitement. And, indeed, the assertion that
each of the incitement elements are present in the single,
stationary, and unattended communication “strains credulity.”155
Intent is difficult to prove, even with face-to-face communications.
146 Id. at 582. The court conflated the inquiries into objective intent and the form
of the communication, concluding after examining the import of the words to viewers that





151 Id. at 582–83 (rejecting argument that a New York viewer would understand
the advertisement as advocating violence because, unlike viewers in the other cities, they
had not seen a prior advertisement that the current advertisement parodied, and
because New York is a more prominent terrorism target than other cities).
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The words were few, and did not explicitly urge action.156 Most
notably, the requirement that recipients will likely and
imminently be persuaded to engage in conduct that carries with
it criminal punishment is a high bar.157 The requirement that they
be likely to break the law immediately while in the status of a
participant in an operational enterprise, such as an employee or
bus passenger, is almost impossible tomeet.158 So, when compared
to the requirements of the Brandenburg incitement exception,
MTA’s claims that listeners would react in a harmful manner to
this speech appear exaggerated.159
It is not clear, however, that the threat of violence or other
unlawful acts of terror was the true focus of MTA’s concern. MTA
is charged with providing safe, efficient, and cost-effective
transportation, not preventing public harms.160 Most likely, and
appropriately, the harms MTA sought to avoid by excluding the
advertisement were to its own operations, rather than to the public
welfare more generally. MTA could have made the judgment that
viewers upon which its existence depends—employees and
patrons, current and potential—would react to the image of the
menacing Muslim man, combined with an attributed intent to kill
people, by avoiding buses on which the advertisement was posted,
or avoidingMTA transit altogether.161 In this scenario, MTAwould
156 Cf. Nwanguma v. Trump, 903 F.3d 604, 611–12 (6th Cir. 2018) (interpreting
incitement doctrine to require that “thewords used specifically advocate[ ] the use of violence,
whether explicitly or implicitly,” and finding that candidate Trump’s words “get ‘em out of
here,” said to a crowd of supporters at a convention center campaign rally, referring to
protesters, “may have had a tendency to elicit a physical response, in the event a disruptive
protester refused to leave, but . . . did not specifically advocate such a response”).
157 See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 581 (“[T]he Supreme
Court has rarely applied the Brandenburg incitement standard, and never explicitly
found speech to be on the proscribable side of the standard.”).
158 See id. at 583 (“[T]here is no evidence that seeing one of [the ‘Killing Jews’]
advertisements on the back of a bus would be sufficient to trigger a violent reaction.”).
Exterior transit advertising is directed to citizen listeners and does not fit the paradigm
of a nonpublic forum. Presumably, this court would have found it even less likely that
the same advertisement, displayed inside a bus or transit terminal, would trigger
immediate unlawful conduct by viewers.
159 Cf. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 315 (1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that “public officials have strong incentives to
overregulate even in the absence of an intent to censor particular views,” which “stem[ ]
from the fact that of the two groups whose interests officials must accommodate—on the
one hand, the interests of the general public and, on the other, the interests of those who
seek to use a particular forum for First Amendment activity—the political power of the
former is likely to be far greater than that of the latter”).
160 Cf. N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1998)
(noting that transit authority’s reason for excluding an advertisement to prevent privacy
violations was the concern of the government-as-sovereign, not as a transit agency).
161 See CarolynMala Corbin, Terrorists Are Always Muslim but Never White: At the
Intersection of Critical Race Theory and Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 455, 458 (2017)
(stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists influence the conduct of those who see them); Antske
Fokkens et al., Studying Muslim Stereotyping Through Microportrait Extraction, in LREC
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have sought to exclude the advertisement because the conduct its
message would likely provoke would undermine its mission to
provide the public service of transportation by convincing
employees and patrons to stay away.
MTA attempted to use the incitement exception to justify
its regulation of this speech; however, this framing was not
successful due to doctrinal constraints that have been imported
from the realm of public communication. These constraints
effectively limited MTA’s ability to regulate the speech from both
sides. On one side, were it to characterize the conduct it sought to
avoid as the result of listener “offense” at the hateful content of the
advertisement, its move to exclude it would run up against the
Court’s “broad sense” of viewpoint discrimination.162 In a recent
decision invalidating application by the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) of a federal statutory provision prohibiting
registration of trademarks which, inter alia, disparage “racial or
ethnic groups,” 163 the plurality, in reasoning echoed by the four
concurring justices, held that even the most broadly stated
exception, which “evenhandedly prohibits disparagement of all
groups,” is viewpoint discriminatory.164 Although content
discrimination is permissible in management of nonpublic forums,
viewpoint discrimination is prohibited in all types of forums.165
On the other side, were MTA to characterize the conduct
it sought to avoid as the result of persuasion—that viewers should
understand that they are hated and unwelcome, and should stay
away—166 then the existing incitement exception presumptively
2018 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 3734 (Nicoletta Calzolari et al. eds., 2018) https://www.
aclweb.org/anthology/L18-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA24-3JRT] (“Media coverage of different
groups in society influences the perception people have about these groups and even increases
distrust and polarization among different groups.”).
162 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (plurality opinion) (“Giving
offense is a viewpoint.”); id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (distinguishing positive from
derogatory trademarks “reflects the Government’s disapproval of a subset of messages it
finds offensive,” which is “the essence of viewpoint discrimination”). Because circuit
precedent classified the MTA advertising program as a designated public forum, in which
content discrimination is forbidden, the breadth of the Court’s interpretation of the scope
of viewpoint discrimination is of less significance than in other similar advertising and
other forums that are classified as nonpublic.
163 Id. at 1755; see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006) (prohibiting registration of
trademarks that may “disparage . . . or bring . . . into contempt, or disrepute” any “persons,
living or dead”), invalidated by Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1755 (2017) (plurality
opinion) (interpreting the provision to include marks that disparage “non-juristic entities
such as racial and ethnic groups”).
164 See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1763; id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“To prohibit
all sides from criticizing their opponents makes a law more viewpoint based not less so.”).
165 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37,46 (1983).
166 See Shaima Hassan, Islamophobia and Media Stigma Is Having Real Effects
on Muslim Mothers in Maternity Services, CONVERSATION (Dec. 10, 2018), https://
theconversation.com/amp/islamophobia-and-media-stigma-is-having-real-effects-on-
muslim-mothers-in-maternity-services-101768?%20(PhD%20study%20shows%20that%
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marks the limit of its authority to exclude the speech, because
acting to avoid the persuasive effect of the message on viewers
outside the boundaries of the exception would be viewpoint
discriminatory.167 Viewed in this way, MTA’s awkward effort to fit
its exception into the incitement category illustrates the lack of
alternatives it, like other created forum managers, perceives
under existing doctrine to host broad categories of outside speech
but nevertheless exclude discrete instances of speech within those
categories that they predict will cause severe harm to their
abilities to carry out their core delegated functions by persuading
enterprise participants, essential to their operations, to leave.
MTA’s response to the court mandate that it publish the
speech it viewed as dangerous to its operations serves as a
harbinger of how other created forum managers may respond to
this doctrinal squeeze. After AFDI won an injunction ordering
MTA to run the “Killing Jews” advertisement,168 MTA closed its
advertising forum inside and outside all public transit to all public
issue ads.169 Other transportation agencies in Philadelphia,
Chicago, Seattle, andWashington, D.C. have done the same thing,
limiting the outside speech they permit to commercial
advertising.170 These agencies have lost millions of dollars in
revenue yearly due to the change, and a wide range of public issue
speakers have lost an outlet for their speech.171 Outside transit
20Muslim%20women%20avoid%20discussing%20health%20needs%20with%20doctors%2
0because%20of%20fear%20of%20negative%20perceptions%20created%20by%20media%2
0images);%20twitter_impression=true [https://perma.cc/Z68C-8P3F] (PhD study showing
that Muslim women avoid discussing health needs with doctors because of fear of negative
perceptions created by media images); Melissa Fisher Paoni, Understanding the Harm in
Hate Speech, ILL. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://illinoistimes.com/article-20600-under
standing-the-harm-in-hate-speech.html [https://perma.cc/VF8P-L853] (“Hate speech leads
to consequential harm, which persuades hearers to believe negative stereotypes and
engage in harmful conduct while normalizing discrimination, and constitutive harm, which
involves indirect effects related to power imbalances.”).
167 The Court has not determined whether the Brandenburg incitement
category authorizes the government to discriminate according to viewpoint. One lower
court has done so. See Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual All. v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543, 1549 (11th
Cir. 1997).
168 See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 70 F. Supp. 3d 572,
575 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated on other grounds, 109 F. Supp. 3d 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
169 The MTA’s Advertising Policy: Frequently Asked Questions, METRO. TRANSP.
AUTH. (Nov. 15, 2018), http://web.mta.info/mta/realestate/PDF/MTA-Advertising-
FAQs.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3GW-RUEQ].
170 Allegra Kirkland, The MTA’s Ban on ‘Political’ Ads Has Turned It into the
Free-Speech Police, NATION (June 21, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-
mtas-ban-on-political-ads-has-turned-it-into-the-free-speech-police/ [https://perma.cc/Y6
U4-95WX]; Emma G. Fitzsimmons,M.T.A. Board Votes to Ban Political Ads on Subways
and Buses, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/30/nyregion/
mta-board-votes-to-ban-political-ads-on-subways-and-buses.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/5YX6-YXAF].
171 See WASH. METRO. AREA TRANSIT AUTH, ADVERTISING AND RETAIL POLICY
REVIEW, at 9 (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.wmata.com/about/board/meetings/board-pdfs/
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advertising programs, the wide range of government agencies that
could choose to open their property to broadcast some scope of
private speech to their employees, clients, or patrons by means of
mail systems, chatrooms, websites, and display boards and spaces,
are certainly taking note of the widely publicized transit agency
experience and likely either restricting, closing or not opening
private speech opportunities within their enterprises.172
Perhaps these consequences are the inevitable result of fully
protecting private speakers from the risk of dangerous government
censorship.173 It could be, however, that an impulse toward bright
lines and uniform applications ignores constitutionally salient
differences in government responsibilities, speakers’ rights, and the
impact of speechdistinctions that underpin the incitement definition
and that caused the Court to create the distinct category of the
nonpublic forum in the first place.174 A more nuanced definition of
the government’s authority to exclude speech, tailored to the
circumstances of the nonpublic forum, could better implement
constitutional values while preserving the spirit of theBrandenburg
incitement exception.175
upload/110515_3AAdvertisingandRetailPolicyReview.pdf [https://perma.cc/4H85-HVEX]
(“Since the temporary ban on issue-oriented advertising was enacted, WMATA and our
contractor have foregone approximately $1.6 million in advertising sales that we would
have otherwise shared. This includes $500,000 in existing contracts that were refunded
and approximately $1.1 million in new business that was rejected upon review by a panel
of attorneys from WMATA’s General Counsel’s Office. Some examples of the existing
advertisers whose contracts were cancelled include the Airline Pilot Association, the D.C.
Department of Public Health, Corn Farms, Alzheimer’s Association, Knights of Columbus
and the American Association of Railroads, all of which were considered advocacy ads.”).
172 See Gay Guardian Newspaper v. Ohoopee Reg’l Library Sys., 235 F. Supp. 2d
1362, 1373–79 (S.D. Ga. 2002) (“Faced with a choice between possible First Amendment
litigation regarding denial of access to an open forum for some persons and the ability to
close the nonpublic forum completely, many prudent property managers may be expected
to choose the legally safe harbor of closing the nonpublic forum altogether.” (quoting Sefick
v. United States, No. 98-C5301, 1999 WL 778588, at * 15 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 1999))), aff’d, 90
F. App’x 386 (11th Cir. 2003) (unpublished table decision). Whether closing a nonpublic
forum in all circumstances is “legally safe” is unclear. See Stephen R. Elzinga, Note,
Retaliatory Forum Closure, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 499–503 (2011) (collecting cases of forum
closure and arguing that forum closure for a viewpoint-discriminatory purpose should be
unconstitutional); Kerry L. Monroe, Note, Purpose and Effects: Viewpoint-Discriminatory
Closure of a Designated Public Forum, 44 U.MICH. J.L. REFORM 985, 987 (2011) (same).
173 SeeMatal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (plurality opinion) (“[A] bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment . . . is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”
(quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989))); id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(permitting the Patent and Trademark Office to exclude “disparaging” marks would risk
“silenc[ing] dissent and distort[ing] the marketplace of ideas”).
174 See Smolla, supra note 7, at 14 (“[A] doctrinal standard formulated to
vindicate [free speech] values in one specific context is not necessarily appropriate when
those values surface in tension with other social interests in other contexts.”).
175 Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1357,
1386 (2001) (“[W]hile the government may have little discretion to apply ‘risky’ standards
in the context of speech regulations, which might excise certain speech entirely from the
marketplace of ideas, slightly more risk may be tolerable in the context of a forum that
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C. Incitement Lite in the Nonpublic Forum
The Brandenburg incitement exception has as its
threshold requirement that a speaker “advoca[te] . . . the use of
force or . . . law violation.”176 The common presumption is that
this requirement defines the exclusive universe of speech that
the government may restrict on the theory that its message may
persuade listeners to engage in harmful conduct.177 Another
possibility, however, is that the particular elements of the
Brandenburg incitement exception identify when speech that
borders on criminal crosses the line so that the government-as-
sovereign may punish it as a crime, but that other, or adjusted
elements, may define when the government, acting in a different
capacity, with different public responsibilities, may regulate in
different ways speech that may persuade listeners to engage in
different types of harmful conduct. Forum doctrine, and its
articulation of the different scope of authority of institutional
entities to manage the content of nonpublic communication by
private individuals they invite into their operational domains,
developed after the Court settled on the Brandenburg
incitement exception.178 The many differences that exist between
the scope of government authority to restrict private speech, the
impact on private speech opportunities from such regulation,
and the effect on the broader free speech marketplace when the
government-as-sovereign uses the heavy hammer of criminal
punishment to remove persuasive speech entirely from all
channels of public communication as opposed to when the
government as a single institutional entity manages the private
speech that it permits to be broadcast within its operational
realm make nonpublic forum management ripe for application
of some adjusted form of incitement lite.179
occupies a limited space in the marketplace of ideas, that the government need not create
and can close at will.” (footnote omitted)).
176 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
177 Scholars have addressed difficulties caused by this presumption in various
contexts. See, e.g., David Franklyn, Media Violence Tort Cases: Problems of Causation
and the First Amendment, 27 N. KY. L. REV. i, i–ii (2000) (introducing symposium);
Andrew B. Sims, Tort Liability for Physical Injuries Allegedly Resulting from Media
Speech: A Comprehensive First Amendment Approach, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 231, 233, 233 n.4
(1992) (listing scholarly commentary on torts resulting from media-disseminated
speech); Alexander Tsesis, Foreword: Terrorist Incitement on the Internet, 86 FORDHAM
L. REV. 367, 367 (2017) (introducing symposium).
178 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46
(1983) (setting out forum analysis).
179 Cf. David S. Han, Managing Constitutional Boundaries in Speech-Tort
Jurisprudence, 69 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (arguing that the Court has
erroneously presumed “that the risk of impermissible chilling effects and the potential
for government abuse—the fundamental reasons for extending First Amendment
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Although all elements of the definition must be
reconsidered, the element most in need of adjustment to fit
nonpublic forum management is the end the government may
seek to achieve by restricting persuasive speech. The government-
as-sovereign is charged with enforcing public laws to keep public
order. Preventing illegal action is the end the government-as-
sovereign may seek to achieve when it restricts speech because its
message persuades listeners to engage in harmful conduct.180 The
government as institutional entity is charged with ensuring
efficient operation of its enterprise to provide a public service.
Preventing listener conduct that disrupts the efficient operation
of the enterprise, or, more narrowly, disrupts the operations so
severely that it undermines its ability to provide the public
service, is more appropriately the end the government as
institutional entity may seek to achieve according to the same
theory of connection between speech and action.181
Again, transit advertising provides a more generally
applicable example of the appropriate scope of nonpublic
managers’ authority to exclude speech that persuades viewers to
engage in harmful conduct. Transit agencies widely believe that
they have the authority to exclude advertisements that persuade
their passengers to use alternate means of transportation.182 This
authority would allow transit agencies to exclude from the view
protection to tort liability—are effectively identical in the speech-tort context as
compared to the direct-regulation context,” that this error “has caused the Court to adopt
a highly blunt, excessively prophylactic approach to speech-tort cases that threatens to
overprotect speech interests at the expense of tort interests,” and that a “more modest,
contextualized approach[ ] ” to assessing speech restrictions would better balance
government authority and speaker interests in the speech-tort context).
180 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48.
181 See supra notes 149–153.
182 See Bus/Trolley Advertising Policy and Regulations, HARBOR TRANSIT,
https://harbortransit.org/advertising-policy/ [https://perma.cc/YD2V-GEAE] (excluding
“[a]dvertising that encourages persons to refrain from using Harbor Transit or public
transit in general” and “[a]dvertising that explicitly and directly promotes or encourages
the use of means of transportation in direct competition with public transit”); Southern
California Regional Rail Authority, METROLINK, https://www.metrolinktrains.com/
globalassets/customer-service/scrra_revenue_advertising_policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA
S4-KK8X] (excluding advertising that “[c]ontains images, copy or concepts that actively
denigrate public transportation or the services provided by Metrolink”); MTA Advertising
Policy, METRO. TRANSP. AUTH., http://web.mta.info/mta/realestate/PDF/MTA_Ad_Policy_
April_2015.PDF [https://perma.cc/9HDF-GFJF] (excluding advertising that “[e]ncourages
or depicts unsafe behavior with respect to MTA’s transportation operations, such as failure
to comply with normal safety precautions in awaiting, boarding, riding upon or debarking
from MTA vehicles, or is otherwise directly adverse to the commercial, administrative or
operational interests of the MTA as a business”); SFMTA Advertising Policy, S.F. MUN.
TRANSP. AGENCY, https://www.sfmta.com/sites/default/files/reports-and-documents/2017/
11/sfmta_advertising_policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZAP-DBYZ] (excluding “[a]dvertising,
or anymaterial contained in it, that is directly adverse to the commercial or administrative
interests of the SFMTA, or that tends to disparage the quality of service provided by the
SFMTA, or that tends to disparage public transportation generally”).
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of their passengers advertisements like those broadcast by Uber
(woman sadly eyeing a departing subway train next to the slogan,
“You can’t miss an Uber”) and Lyft (slogan on closed subway
doors: “we would’ve held the door for you”).183 Obviously, these
advertisements seek to persuade public transit passengers to
abandon that mode of transportation and, in fact, they seem to
successfully do so, severely undercutting the ability of the transit
systems to perform their public functions effectively.184 The
conduct that the advertisements are designed to provoke strikes
at the very heart of the transit agencies’ delegated authority, like
unlawful action does to the responsibility of the government-as-
sovereign to keep public order. Equally as obviously, excluding
the advertisements because of listeners’ reactions to the
persuasive messages would be viewpoint discrimination outside
the boundaries of the Brandenburg incitement exception.185 This
dilemma thus poses the question succinctly: does the Constitution
require public entities to broadcast commercial advertising that
disparages their services and directly urges passengers to spend
their money on a competing product as a condition to running the
advertising program that helps fund their operations and defray
the fares they charge their public constituency?186
183 Angie Schmitt, Uber and Lyft Ads Are Really Annoying Us Lately,
STREETSBLOG, https://usa.streetsblog.org/2018/10/31/uber-and-lyft-ads-are-really-annoying-
us-lately/ [https://perma.cc/J4U9-PGJW].
184 See id. (asserting that Uber and Lyft advertising on New York City subway
and other transit vehicles “worked” and citing “[a] study from Boston [that] found [forty-
two] percent of Uber and Lyft users were substituting the services for transit[,] [and]
[a]nother study [that] showed that vehicle miles traveled from Uber and Lyft increased
the fastest in cities—like New York and Boston—that had relatively strong transit
ridership, prior to their arrival”); Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Subway Ridership Dropped
Again in New York as Passengers Flee to Uber, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/nyregion/subway-ridership-nyc-metro.html [https://perm
a.cc/Z7KF-YJEB] (“[R]idership dropped for the second year in a row [on the New York
subway system] as passengers flee the system for Uber and other ride-hailing services,
draining the transit system of badly needed revenue.”).
185 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995)
(holding exclusion based on a “prohibited perspective, not the general subject matter” is
viewpoint discriminatory).
186 The standard of review of restrictions on advertising is not clear. The Court
has not yet abandoned the “relaxed scrutiny” for commercial speech established in Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). SeeMatal v.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (applying Central Hudson review to trademark registration
requirement and finding the test not to be met). Nevertheless, as Justice Kennedy
emphasized in Matal, the Court has held that even with commercial speech, “the First
Amendment ‘requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates a regulation
of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.’” 137 S. Ct. at 1767
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Exception of advertisements urging patrons to
go elsewhere is message-sensitive in this way, so, if pressed, the Court would almost
certainly find “heightened scrutiny” of the type that applies to noncommercial speech
restrictions rather than Central Hudson scrutiny to apply.
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The Brandenburg incitement exception is designed to
protect abstract criticism of the government and its policies while
segregating speech that urges listeners to take specific action that
directly subverts its public charge to maintain order. An adjusted
nonpublic forum incitement exception could maintain the spirit of
the Brandenburg distinction while still incorporating the different
scope of conduct that most severely threatens the continued
existence and effective functioning of an institutional government
entity, which is the conduct of participants on which it depends to
function abandoning the enterprise. In practice, this might mean
that transit agencies would have to accept advertising that
criticized their actions or policies, but that they could exclude
advertising, like those of Uber or Lyft, which directly urges
passengers to use competing services in lieu of those they offer.
This scope of authority to restrict persuasive speech extends
beyond the boundaries of the Brandenburg exception, but only
somewhat, and in a narrow and defined way that mirrors the
government-as-sovereign’s scope of authority to act against
speakers to avoid the conduct their speech may provoke.
An adjustment to what is considered a permissible end that
a nonpublic forum manager may seek to achieve in this way could
better balance government authority, speaker rights, and the
speechmarket impact because it identifies the core harm thatmost
likely would cause them to close the forum entirely, and so
encourages them to open, or to continue to hold open, private
speech opportunities on their properties.187 The impact on speakers
who want to urge nonpublic forum participants to abandon the
enterprise may be as minimal as a modification in the manner in
which they convey their messages. If it is complete exclusion, then
the speakers have all other channels of public communication and
likely other nonpublic forums hosted by different types of
enterprises to convey their messages. A clear, narrow definition of
the scope of the government’s authority to restrict speech that will
likely persuade participants to abandon the enterprise can limit
the discretion of administrators to discriminate according to
viewpoint outside the boundaries of the adjusted exception.188
Adjustments to other elements of the Brandenburg
exception may be required to define the appropriate scope of a
nonpublic forum incitement exception.With respect to the Uber and
187 See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 680 (1998).
188 See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. King County, 796 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir.
2015) (stating requirement of reasonableness in a nonpublic forum is that an exclusion
standard “be ‘sufficiently definite and objective to prevent arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement’” (quoting Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King County, 781 F.3d
489, 500 (9th Cir. 2015))).
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Lyft advertisements, the requirement that the speaker intend to
incite viewers to leave the enterprise is met. Whether this should be
a requirement of an adjusted nonpublic forum incitement exception
is much less clear, since the threat of criminal punishment, and the
chilling effect that it may provoke in speakers who intend to engage
in protected speech, is the best justification for it.189 A strict
interpretation of the imminence requirement would need to be
relaxed to take into account the circumstances in which nonpublic
forum speech is presented, which is frequently unattended displays
such as the transit advertising forum. As part of the broader
question of whether the conduct nonpublic forum managers predict
is likely harmful enough to justify restricting speech, courts should
apply an adjusted inquiry into imminence that requires a credible
connection to harm. Thiswould ensure that these entities have some
scope of authority to restrict speech.190
Another example helps to explore the scope of an incitement
lite exception that permits nonpublic forum managers to restrict
speech submissions that urge participants in the enterprise to stay
away. For a short time in Canada, GeneralMotors (GM) tried to sell
its cars by means of an advertisement featuring a large photo of a
bus with a destination header titled “Creeps and Weirdos.”191 The
clear message, of course, was that bus riders are socially unequal
and undesirable, and that viewers should abandon bus
transportation for GM’s cars. The advertisement directly urges
passengers to leave andmarket research presumably predicted that
it would be effective, so on these grounds alone, it could fall within
an adjusted incitement lite exception. The “Creeps and Weirdos”
messaging, however, presents a variation. As a persuasive
technique, to achieve its end, which in this instancewas commercial,
GM unambiguously attacked the social worth of necessary
participants in the bus transit enterprise, labeling them as unfit for
other participants to associate with on an equal basis. GM’s purpose
was not to trigger action by the passengers it attacked, but rather to
influence potential passengerswhowould notwant to associatewith
them or, if they chose to stay on the bus, become like them. Still, the
additional question that this example presents is the same: does the
Constitution require public entities to broadcast commercial
189 See Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 94 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[In the
nonpublic forum] there is no serious concern about . . . chilling effects, where there are no
consequences for submitting a non-conforming advertisement and having it rejected.”).
190 Alexander, supra note 54, at 599 (questioning the relevance of “imminence
independent of its bearing on likelihood”).
191 Creeps Campaign Spurs Protest in Vancouver, B.C., METROMAG. (Apr. 1, 2003),
https://www.metro-magazine.com/management-operations/article/210433/creeps-campaign-
spurs-protest-in-vancouver-bc. [https://perma.cc/49UF-SQGB]. These advertisements were
not placed on buses. Id.
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advertising that attacks the social worth of their participants, and
which will persuade participants that they are unwelcome and may
provoke them to leave, or, may persuade other viewers to treat them
as unwelcome, which may also drive them away?
A narrow, but adjusted incitement lite exception could
allow nonpublic forummanagers some scope of authority to reject
submissions that vilify their participants as a persuasive
technique to sell a commercial product, or to require modifications
to remove the message that viewers should abandon the
enterprise. A transit agency could, for example, require
modification of the GM advertisement to promote the cars
without attacking the customers. A speaker’s mode of
communicating an idea, however hateful, is protected in public
communication like the content of the idea itself.192 The different
balance of interests in the nonpublic forum could allow managers
some scope of authority to require that speakers modify
persuasive techniques that target abuse at employees or the
members of the public the agency is charged with serving.
If an incitement lite exception were to permit nonpublic
forummanagers to exclude speech that targets hate at enterprise
participants as an indirect means of persuasion to purchase a
product, it could also permit some scope of authority to exclude
such speech as a direct means of persuasion to participants in the
enterprise that they should behave with hate toward other
participants or, if they are its targets, that they should behave as
if they are hated, and leave the enterprise. MTA’s effort to exclude
the “Killing Jews” advertisement raises this possibility.193 MTA
could have concluded that the image of themenacingMuslimman
and accompanying text would prompt instant and visceral hate
reactions in some viewers, either that they should hate or are
hated, akin to the reflexive reaction in the Brandenburg
paradigm, and that some number of viewers—passengers,
prospective passengers, or employees—would move from opinion
change to the action of abandoning public transportation, or at
least the buses on which the advertisements were posted.
This is one of several meanings that the “Killing Jews”
advertisement may send to viewers and, for this reason, it may not
meet the requirement that it express hate in a way that is likely to
persuade viewers to take action. More direct messaging identifies
the issue more clearly. Consider a hypothetical submission of much
192 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16–18, 25 (1971) (invalidating disorderly
conduct conviction for wearing a jacket with “Fuck the Draft” on the back in the lobby of
a courthouse and noting that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric”).
193 See supra Section II.A.2.
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larger and much more numerous postings, of the same menacing-
man photowith the simple and succinct text such as “FearMenLike
This!” or “Men Like This Not Welcome In Here!” inside vehicles
occupying most or all of the advertising space or throughout bus or
subways terminals as part of a “domination campaign.”194 However
infrequent such direct hate message submissions may be, or
however unlikely that they will take the form of such overwhelming
messaging, the extreme possibilities frame the question whether
nonpublic forum managers must accept hate messages targeted at
their internal audience if they accept other types of advertisements
addressing the same subject matter.
The government-as-sovereign must tolerate these types
of messages on public forum property and must address the
consequences through means other than suppressing speech
when it persuades viewers to act hatefully toward each other, or
to leave public spaces because they are persuaded that they are
unwelcome there. Nonpublic forum managers have a stronger,
and more focused interest, in avoiding speech that will alienate
participants in their enterprises. Nevertheless, the ever-
tightening doctrinal constraints seem to make it impossible for
them to exclude such speech from inside their operational
domains in a way that escapes condemnation as viewpoint
discriminatory. A tightly defined incitement lite exception that
allowed nonpublic forum managers authority to exclude some
narrowly drawn scope of hate messaging targeted at their
employees, clients, or patrons, when that speech will likely
persuade viewers to abandon the enterprise, might not be used
often, but knowing that it could be, might provide these
managers breathing space to fulfill free speech values by
opening valuable speech channels that the Constitution permits
them to close entirely.
CONCLUSION
Over the decades, the incitement exception, which defines
the line between protected advocacy of ideas and unprotected
urging of unlawful action, has evolved, and narrowed, so that even
in the realm of face-to-face public issue protests, demonstrations,
and rallies that explain its evolution, it rarely justifies restriction
194 Own the Station, OUTFRONT, https://www.outfrontmedia.com/media/additional-
media/station-domination [https://perma.cc/NR93-R4PU] (link to amedia company that helps
those seeking to “dominate” a subway station to surround commuters with brand messages).
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of dangerous speech.195 The narrow exception may, or may not,196
appropriately balance free speech rights and government authority
to restrict persuasive speech in the public realm, where the threat
of falling within the definition is criminal punishment, and the
result of doing so is that political and social issue speech is removed
from the marketplace of ideas entirely. In the context of nonpublic
forum management, however, where the heavy threat of criminal
punishment does not hang over private speakers seeking access,
an adjusted form of incitement lite, which defines a different, more
nuanced and tailored, scope of government authority to regulate
speech that persuades listeners to engage in harmful conduct may
better implement constitutional values than the blunt, one-size-
fits-all Brandenburg incitement category.
195 See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 70 F. Supp. 3d 572,
581 (S.D.N.Y.) (“[T]he Supreme Court has rarely applied the Brandenburg incitement
standard, and never explicitly found speech to be on the proscribable side of the standard.”),
vacated on other grounds, 109 F. Supp. 3d 626, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
196 See generally Alexander, supra note 54 (reviewing and critiquing elements
of the Brandenburg definition of incitement).
